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COPYRIGHT IN THE ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT AUTHOR: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH USING PHILIP BOBBITT’S MODALITIES 
OF INTERPRETATION 
Brian Golger* 
INTRODUCTION 
“It is often said that the greatest artists in the history of humanity are those who create 
art in an era of scarcity.  In an age of abundance, artificial intelligence has the 
potential to be equally revolutionary in the world of art.” 
—OpenAI, GPT-21 
In October 2018, the sale of a portrait captured the imagination of art 
critics and science fiction fans alike.  The painting, Edmond de Belamy, from La 
Famille de Belamy sold for $432,500 in an auction by Christie’s.2  The creator 
of this painting was not a famous French impressionist but rather a French 
art collective named Obvious—or more precisely, an algorithm created by 
Obvious.3  The minds behind Obvious used a type of machine learning 
algorithm, a Generative Adversarial Network (“GAN”),4 to enable artificial 
 
*  Articles Editor, Volume 22, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; J.D., 2020, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2015, Bowdoin College.  I would like to give special 
thanks to Professor Gideon Parchomovsky who inspired me to pursue this topic and provided 
guidance on this Comment.  I would also like to thank the Editors of Volume 22 for their excellent 
work. 
1  This quote was generated using OpenAI’s GPT-2 text generation system.  The artificial intelligence 
of GPT-2 was trained on a dataset of eight million web pages with the objective of predicting the 
next word, given all of the previous words within some text.  It is now capable of generating full 
paragraphs of coherent language.  For example, a user can feed GPT-2 a fake headline and it will 
generate a story, or they can provide the first line of a poem and it will supply a whole verse.  Alec 
Radford et al., Better Language Models and Their Implications, OPENAI (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/; see also James Vincent, OpenAI Has Published the 
Text-Generating AI It Said Was Too Dangerous to Share, VERGE (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/7/20953040/openai-text-generation-ai-gpt-2-full-model-
release-1-5b-parameters.  The quote used here was generated from the input: “Who is the author 
of a piece of art generated by artificial intelligence?” 
 2 Gabe Cohn, AI Art at Christie’s Sells for $432,500, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2018/10/25/arts/design/ai-art-sold-christies.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets (Neural Info. Processing Sys. Conference Paper, 
2014), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf; see also Thalles Silva, An Intuitive Introduction 
to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), FREECODECAMP (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.freecodeca
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intelligence to create the painting.5  Whereas great artists of the past would 
have honed their craft by practicing under the apprenticeship of master 
artists, Obvious’s algorithm was fed with a data set of 15,000 portraits 
painted between the fourteenth and twentieth centuries that it used to 
“teach” itself what a portrait looks like.6  The end result was a masterpiece 
that easily outsold the Warhol and Lichtenstein prints it hung across from, 
prompting Christie’s to declare “the arrival of AI art on the world auction 
stage.”7 
In March 2019, Sotheby’s joined the fray, becoming the second major 
auction house to auction off a piece of art generated by artificial intelligence.8  
That work, entitled Memories of Passersby I, was created by Mario 
Klingemann—a German artist and pioneer in the field of artificial 
intelligence art—and sold for £40,000.9  Klingemann’s work consists of a 
machine and two framed screens that work in real time to display portraits 
of male and female faces onto the screens.10  Using a database of portraits 
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the work uses GANs to 
generate a portrait every few seconds.11  The result is an endless stream of 
images, no two the same, that allows viewers to witness the artificial 
intelligence at work.12  
While the price the paintings fetched is remarkable, the reality is machine 
authored works are nothing new.  In the past few years, artificial intelligence 
 
mp.org/news/an-intuitive-introduction-to-generative-adversarial-networks-gans-7a2264a81394/ 
(explaining GANs consist of two different neural networks locked in a game, where the generator 
tries to reproduce data from a training set and the discriminator acts as a judge to decide whether 
the input comes from the generator or the true training set). 
 5 Cohn, supra note 2. 
 6 Is Artificial Intelligence Set to Become Art’s Next Medium?, CHRISTIE’S (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-mac
hine-9332-1.aspx. 
 7 Id. 
 8 James Vincent, A Never-Ending Stream of AI Art Goes Up for Auction, VERGE (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251267/ai-art-gans-mario-klingemann-auction-sotheby
s-technology. 
 9 Contemporary Art Day Auction, SOTHEBY’S (Mar. 6, 2019), http://www.sothebys.com/en/auc
tions/ecatalogue/2019/contemporary-art-day-auction-l19021/lot.109.html.  While this price may 
be disappointing in comparison to Obvious’s Edmond de Belamy, the sale does show a continuing 
viability of artificial-intelligence art. 
 10 Naomi Rea, Sotheby’s Is Entering the AI Art Fray, Selling a Surreal Artwork by One of the Movement’s Pioneers 
This Spring, ARTNET (Feb. 8, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/sothebys-artificial-
intelligence-1460332. 
 11 Vincent, supra note 8. 
 12 Id. 
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has co-authored a short novel that almost won a literary prize,13 reported an 
earthquake within three minutes of it occurring,14 and generated a video 
game world featuring over eighteen quintillion planets.15  Recently, teenage 
coder Robbie Barrat used artificial intelligence to generate a song in the style 
of Kanye West by feeding the algorithm six thousand of the rapper’s lyrics.16  
While originally only capable of rearranging existing lyrics, the algorithm is 
now capable of writing its own songs entirely.17  There are many artists in 
the budding field of artificial intelligence art who work with GANs and other 
types of machine learning to develop breathtaking works of art.18  The 
artificial intelligence movement’s use of open-source code allows many new 
entrants19 and there is nothing to suggest this progress will slow down any 
time soon, considering the projected growth of artificial intelligence.20 
The buzz surrounding the artificial intelligence art “revolution” has been 
shared by the legal world, as well.  In the last five years, there have been a 
number of law review articles grappling with the implications machine 
authorship has on copyright law.  So far, however, most of these articles have 
focused on whether there should be copyright in works generated by artificial 
 
 13 Chloe Olewitz, A Japanese AI Program Just Wrote a Short Novel, and It Almost Won a Literary Prize, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/japanese-ai-writes-novel-
passes-first-round-nationanl-literary-prize/. 
 14 Will Oremus, The First News Report on the L.A. Earthquake Was Written by a Robot, SLATE (Mar. 17, 
2014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/03/quakebot-los-angeles-times-robot-journalist-writes
-article-on-la-earthquake.html. 
 15 Simon Parkin, No Man’s Sky: The Game Where You Can Explore 18 Quintillion Planets, GUARDIAN (July 
12, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/12/no-mans-sky-18-
quintillion-planets-hello-games. 
 16 ROBBIE BARRAT, NETWORKS WITH ATTITUDE (SoundCloud Mar. 1 2017), available at 
https://soundcloud.com/robbiebarrat/networks-with-attitude; Dave Gershgorn, A West Virginia 
Teen Taught Himself How to Build a Rapping AI Using Kayne West Lyrics, QUARTZ (Mar. 17, 2017), 
https://qz.com/920091/a-west-virginia-teen-taught-himself-how-to-build-a-rapping-ai-using-kan
ye-west-lyrics/. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Naomi Rea, Has Artificial Intelligence Brought Us the Next Great Art Movement? Here are 9 Pioneering Artists 
Who Are Exploring AI’s Creative Potential, ARTNET  (Nov. 6, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/market/9-
artists-artificial-intelligence-1384207. 
 19 See Tom Simonite, We Made Our Own Artificial Intelligence Art, and So Can You, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/we-made-artificial-intelligence-art-so-can-you/ (detailing the 
author’s efforts to create his own artificial intelligence art using existing code on GitHub). 
 20 See Artificial Intelligence Market Size is Projected to be Around US$ 191 Billion by 2024, MARKETWATCH 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/artificial-intelligence-market-size-is-
projected-to-be-around-us-191-billion-by-2024-2018-08-08 (projecting the artificial intelligence 
market to exceed $191 billion by 2024). 
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intelligence21 or who should own the copyright in such works,22 the implicit 
assumption being that copyright does in fact exist.23  These articles all 
consider the question within the current framework of the Copyright Act 
without seriously considering the limitations imposed by the Constitution.  
Instead of framing the question as whether there should be copyright, an 
inquiry into whether there constitutionally could be copyright in works 
generated by artificial intelligence allows us to push on the basic premise that 
the impressive outputs generated by these algorithms can qualify for legal 
protection. 
The Copyright Act draws its authority from the Constitution, and so any 
analysis of the copyrightability of a work of art must begin with our founding 
document.  In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (“IP Clause”), the Constitution 
gives Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”24  The algorithms’ 
outputs are works of art that are oftentimes indistinguishable from human 
works, so it may seem intuitive that a work by artificial intelligence can be 
protected by copyright.  If an algorithm’s painting is so similar to a human 
work of art as to pass the Turing Test,25 why should it not be protected from 
unauthorized copying? 
Congress’s power under the IP Clause is not plenary.  A proper reading 
of the IP Clause shows that Congress’s authority is defined by five 
boundaries, none of which Congress may overreach.26  One of these 
 
 21 See, e.g., Raquel Acosta, Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Rights, HARV. J. L. & TECH. DIGEST (Feb. 
17, 2012), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/artificial-intelligence-and-authorship-rights (“If 
allowing AI developers to claim copyrights in their machine’s output incentivizes more creative 
production, legislators should codify this copyright grant in the law.”); see also Bruce Boyden, 
Emergent Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 379 (2016) (offering a test for whether a person should 
be considered the author of a given work). 
 22 See, e.g., Robert Yu, Comment, The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection is Appropriate for 
Fully Independent Computer-Generated Works? 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1257–60 (2017) (considering the 
implications of finding the machine, programmer, or end-user as the author). 
 23 See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 5, 21 (2012) (assuming that the statutory definition could be amended to cover works where 
there is no human author). 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Congress acted swiftly in exercising this power, passing the first 
Copyright Act in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 25 Developed by Alan Turing in 1950, a computer passes the Turing Test when it convinces a 
sufficient number of interrogators into believing that it is not a machine but rather is a human.  The 
Turing Test, STAN. ENCYCL. OF PHIL. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-
test/.  
 26 Dotan Oliar, The Origins and Meaning of the Intellectual Property Clause 50–51 (Sept. 15, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/ip/oliar_ipclause.pdf.  The five 
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limitations on congressional power is that protection under the clause is 
restricted to “authors and inventors.”27  Current copyright law has codified 
this limitation by requiring “works of authorship.”28  As Professor Annemarie 
Bridy notes, “who or what can be an author for purposes of the Copyright 
Act is ultimately a constitutional question.”29  In considering whether a work 
created by artificial intelligence can by copyrighted, the question then 
becomes whether a constitutionally acceptable “author” exists at all. 
It should be noted that this Comment is not concerned with weak 
artificial intelligence, where humans control a predictable output.30  In such 
a circumstance, the author would be the creative force who designed the 
program code with a specific outcome in mind.31  The artificial intelligence 
would be more akin to an artist’s paintbrush than the artist himself.  There 
is also no question that programmers have a strong copyright in the code 
they write.32  Rather, the analysis here focuses on the outputs of a strong type 
of artificial intelligence where the final product is emergent and difficult to 
foresee.33  
 
constitutional limitations are: copyrights can be granted only 1) “to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts”; 2) for “limited times”; 3) to “authors and inventors”; 4) to secure an “exclusive 
right”; 5) for “writings and discoveries.” Id. 
 27 See id. (noting that “protection under the Clause is restricted to authors and inventors”); see also 
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: Will the True Creator 
Please Stand Up?, 71 TULANE L. REV. 1675, 1700 (1997) (stating that the Constitution requires 
copyrights be extended only to “authors”).  
 28 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
 29 Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 395, 398 
(2016). 
 30 See Acosta, supra note 21 (differentiating weak artificial intelligence, which merely creates a program 
tailored to the narrow function, from strong artificial intelligence, which entails randomness, 
autonomy, and machine learning, so the human connection is much more attenuated). 
 31 For example, consider The Next Rembrandt, the artificial intelligence that digitized the painting 
method of Rembrandt.  See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, 
Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New Model, 2017 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 663–64 (2017).  The algorithm there was designed with the explicit purpose 
to create works of art in the style of Rembrandt.  Thus, there is a human programmer controlling 
the creative direction and output of the program who would probably qualify as the author. 
 32 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that a computer program, whether in object code or source code, is protected by copyright law). 
 33 See Boyden, supra note 21, at 378–79 (defining “emergent works” as “works that consist largely of 
creative elements that have emerged unbidden from the operation of the program” and cannot be 
traced directly to a human source).  But see James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-
Authored Work—And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 414–15 (2016) (arguing that 
we should think of computer “authored” works as computer “generated” because current artificial 
intelligence is not yet responsive to incentives or unpredictable enough, and that these computer-
generated works are no different than other works). 
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As of now, the Copyright Office has taken the position that works by 
machines that operate randomly without any creative input from a human 
author, such as a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces 
irregular shapes in fabric without any discernable pattern, do not qualify as 
a work of human authorship.34  However, as the popularity and value of 
artificial intelligence continues to grow, Congress may want to protect these 
works, and thus it is important to understand the constitutional limitations 
placed on Congress in expanding copyright protection. 
Using a step-by-step method of constitutional interpretation, this 
Comment seeks to answer the question of whether the term “author” can be 
properly understood to encompass the creators of the algorithm, the 
algorithm itself, or whether there is no author, in which case it would be 
constitutionally impermissible to grant copyright to machine authored 
works.35  Employing Professor Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional 
interpretation, Part I seeks to analyze the different constitutional arguments 
Congress could make for extending copyright protection to works generated 
by artificial intelligence.  Part II then reconciles the modalities to draw a 
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of extending copyright protection.  
This Comment concludes that a proper reading of the Constitution suggests 
that the programmer of the algorithm can be considered an “author,” and 
thus Congress can extend copyright protection to works of artificial 
intelligence, even though the programmer may not fit the conventional 
definition of “author.” 
I.  ANALYSIS 
Over the course of three evenings in April 1979, Professor Philip Bobbitt 
shared with students and colleagues at the University of Texas School of Law 
what would become a revolutionary approach to constitutional 
interpretation.  These lectures, recorded in a now famous law review 
article,36 provided the groundwork for his later innovative works, 
 
 34 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 
2017) (stating the Copyright Office “will not register works produced by a machine or mere 
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or 
intervention from a human author”). 
 35 See Yu, supra note 22, at 1265–66 (considering the consequences of immediate entry into the public 
domain because of lack of a legal author). 
 36 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1980). 
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Constitutional Fate37 and Constitutional Interpretation,38 where he lays out six 
modalities for understanding the meaning of the Constitution.  Bobbitt’s 
modalities have since become a dominant method to interpreting our 
founding document and have been influential in law classrooms around the 
country.39 
As defined by Bobbitt, a modality is “the way . . . we characterize a form 
of expression as true.”40  In a constitutional sense, we can use modalities to 
characterize certain legal propositions as true.41  The six modalities that 
Bobbitt lays out are as follows: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, 
prudential, and ethical,42 and “[t]here is no constitutional legal argument 
outside these modalities.”43  By employing the modalities to interpret the text 
of the IP Clause, and more specifically the term “author,” this Comment 
concludes that Congress has strong arguments that the programmer of an 
artificially intelligent algorithm can constitutionally be considered the 
“author” for purposes of extending copyright protection to the algorithm’s 
output, despite not fitting a conventional definition of author. 
A.  History 
The first modality we use to interpret the meaning of the Constitution is 
history.  A historical argument “rel[ies] on the intentions of the [F]ramers 
and [R]atifiers of the Constitution”44  and “on a determination of the original 
understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed.”45  This may 
seem like a fruitless exercise—the Framers and Ratifiers could not have 
dreamed of a world where machines were creating their own works of art.  If 
this technology did not exist at the time the Constitution was created, then 
 
 37 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982). 
 38 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 39 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1703–04 (1994) (lauding 
Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate as “one of a handful of truly towering works of constitutional theory in 
the last half-century” and stating, “in every class I teach, and in everything I write, Bobbitt’s book 
is in my mind, influencing and inspiring me”). 
 40 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 11. 
 41 Id. at 12. 
 42 Id. at 12–13.  
 43 Id. at 22.  
 44 Id. at 12; see also, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–92 (1983) (tracing the long history of 
chaplains in Congress to find that prayer in the Nebraska legislature did not violate the 
Establishment clause); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 475 (1857) (relying on history 
to argue African Americans are not considered citizens for purposes of Article III diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 45 Bobbitt, supra note 36, at 700. 
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how could the Framers’ intentions have any relevance?  While the Framers 
undoubtedly did not anticipate the technology we have today, their 
understanding of the word “author” and their interpretation of the IP Clause 
can provide insight into whether machine-authored works can qualify for 
copyright. 
A common method for determining the original meaning of the 
Constitution is to look at dictionaries that existed during the Founding Era.46  
This technique allows us to discover the meaning of the Constitution’s words 
as they were commonly used and understood.47  Most of these period 
dictionaries define “author” as some variant of, “[t]he first mover of any 
thing . . . the efficient cause of any thing.”48  Other definitions have included 
the phrase, “[t]he first beginner . . . of any thing”49 or, “[t]he prime or first 
cause of a thing.”50 In Noah Webster’s dictionary, “author” was defined as 
“one who produces, creates or brings into being; as, God is the author of the 
Universe.”51  What all these definitions have in common is some sense of a 
creator that brings something into being or is the cause.  While some of these 
definitions provide the example of a writer of a book as a common use of 
“author,”52 the definition is in no way restricted to such interpretation. 
Using this objective approach to the word “author,” it is conceivable that 
the programmer is the author of the program’s outputs.  Obvious’s Edmond 
de Belamy portrait could not have been created without the code developed 
by programmers, and so programmers can be understood to be the “first 
mover” of the painting.  Similarly, using the Copyright Office’s example of 
 
 46 Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original 
Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 365 (2014) (citing to Justice Scalia for 
frequently using period dictionaries to determine the “original meaning” of the text). 
 47 Id. at 364–65. 
 48 See, e.g., Author, 1 JOHN ASH, THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1775), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=LDNAAAAAYAAJ; see also 
Author, 1 NATHAN BAILEY, THE NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (4th 
ed. 1756), available at http://books.google.com/books/?id=HXQSAAAAIAAJ. 
 49 See Author, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792) 
[hereinafter Samuel Johnson Dictionary], available at http://books.google.com/books?id=j-
UIAAAAQAAJ.  Professor Maggs has declared the Samuel Johnson Dictionary as “one of the most 
authoritative eighteenth-century dictionaries.”  Maggs, supra note 46, at 359; see also Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (relying on the Samuel Johnson Dictionary to interpret the word 
“limited” in the IP Clause). 
 50 See Author, THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (18th 
ed. 1781), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=xOcIAAAAQAAJ. 
 51 See Author, 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), 
available at https://archive.org/stream/americandictiona01websrich#page/n7/mode/2up. 
 52 Id. 
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a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces irregular shapes,53 the 
machine’s creator is also the “first mover.”  As God created the universe, so 
too does the programmer create the algorithm.  Surely one can “create” or 
“cause” or “begin” some work of art without knowing what the outcome will 
look like.  The programmer is the “prime” of the work of art because she is 
the first in a chain of events that leads to the painting’s creation. 
The definitional case for the program as the author is also plausible.  In 
many of the definitions, there is no use of a pronoun to limit the author to a 
human individual.  The common use of God as an author is an example of 
how the word was used beyond the context of human individuals.54  
Intuitively, it makes sense that Obvious’s algorithm and the weaving machine 
produced or created their works of art, and according to these period 
definitions, the act of creation need not be limited to humans.55  While 
creativity is a limitation in today’s copyright laws,56 these period definitions 
contain no mention of a creativity requirement or any kind of mental process, 
which would limit the understanding of the algorithm as an author. 
However, to get a full picture of the Framers’ intentions, we need to look 
beyond basic definitions.57  The Federalist Papers were written in the fall of 
1787 and spring of 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay, urging ratification of the Constitution.58  This collection of eighty-five 
essays gives modern scholars an invaluable look into the Constitution as 
understood by the Framers, Ratifiers, and the public.  As Professor Gregory 
Maggs has noted, “academic writers and jurists have cited the Federalist 
Papers as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution more than 
any other historical source except the text of the Constitution itself.”59  Any 
 
 53 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 34. 
 54 See Oliar, supra note 26, at 85 (citing to the Journals of the Continental Congress for evidence that God 
was commonly referred to as “the author of man”). 
 55 But see Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“[T]he 
Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to 
animals.”), aff’d on other grounds, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 56 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (denying copyright 
protection to a work for being “devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity”); see also Bridy, supra 
note 23, at 27–28 (concluding that a machine’s “creativity” is “something other than (but owing to) 
the human creativity of its coder”). 
 57 See Maggs, supra note 46, at 364 (stating that dictionaries are usually only used as evidence of 
“objective” meaning). 
 58 Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United 
States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007). 
 59 Id.; see also, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invoking the Federalist Papers 
throughout the opinion as evidence of original intent). 
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historical interpretation of the Constitution would be incomplete without an 
examination of the Federalist Papers. 
The only Federalist Paper which refers to the IP Clause is Federalist 43, 
written by James Madison, which makes short work of the clause, declaring, 
“[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.”60  However, Madison 
does state that the “public good [of copyrights] coincides . . . with the claims 
of individuals.”61  Thus, we can understand the public good of copyright law 
as stemming from the individual creators.  A programmer could fit into this 
understanding, but an algorithm in this sense is not an individual that can 
lay a claim to its creation.  
Federalist 43 also makes clear that the American idea of copyright stems 
from British common law.62  As stated by Lord Mansfield, the source of 
common law for copyright is “that an author should reap the pecuniary 
profits of his own ingenuity and labor.”63  This same emphasis on natural 
rights as the foundation for copyright is also expressed in some colonial 
statutes.64  In the colonial period, a committee including James Madison was 
formed to consider the best way to protect and promote the useful arts.65  On 
May 2, 1783 the committee concluded that “nothing is more properly a 
man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security of 
literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius.”66 
The algorithm does not produce works that are the labor of its mind, nor 
does it need any kind of encouragement or incentive to create.  The 
algorithm does not have a natural right to anything.  Thus, while the Ratifiers 
 
 60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of 
common law.”). 
 63 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 3–14 & n.6 (1994) (citing Millar v. Taylor 
(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252); see also Bridy, supra note 23, at 4 (finding that the Framers used 
England’s Statute of Anne as a model, in which the notion of the author as originator merged with 
Locke’s theory of possessive individualism). 
 64 For example, New Hampshire’s colonial copyright statute stated that “the legal security of the fruits 
of [an ingenious person’s] study and industry . . . is one of the natural rights of all men, there being 
no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labor of his mind.” 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 3, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE 
UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 8 (1973), available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/history/Copyright_Enactments_1783-1973.pdf. 
 65 PATRY, supra note 63, at 14–22. 
 66 Id. (citing 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 211 (1783)).  The committee’s 
sentiments also seem to invoke Hegel’s personality theory, which regards “property as playing a 
central role in defining every person’s distinct personality.”  Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Copyright 
and Personhood, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1039, 1050 (2019). 
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could not even begin to comprehend the artificial intelligence revolution, 
their understanding of “author” would likely not include an algorithm. 
It is less clear whether the programmer can be considered the author in 
a situation of strong artificial intelligence.  A piece of strong artificial 
intelligence, like a mechanical weaving process that randomly produces 
irregular shapes, creates outputs that are unforeseen by the programmer.  
There is no way for the programmer to know what his program will produce.  
The programmer’s code is unquestionably the “fruit of his study” and is the 
“profit of his ingenuity,” but as mentioned earlier, the copyright in his code 
is not at issue here.  The final output is not necessarily a “product of his 
mind” as much as it is a product of the algorithm’s “mind.”  It is a stretch to 
say that the Framers’ understanding of “author” would include either the 
programmer or algorithm.  Thus, while Congress could argue for a broad 
definitional interpretation of “author,” the historical understanding of the 
term suggests that neither the programmer nor algorithm can 
constitutionally be considered an author. 
B.  Text 
The next modality of constitutional interpretation looks at the plain text 
of the Constitution.67  A textual argument “look[s] to the meaning of the 
words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average 
contemporary ‘man on the street.’”68  This method is contained to the text 
and does not consider anything outside the scope of the words of the 
Constitution.  Our understanding of the text can change over time, though.69 
In this case, the plain text reads, “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”70  The crux of this analysis turns on the word 
“author” because the Constitution does not permit copyright in any work of 
art that comes into existence, but only those created by authors.  However, 
there is nothing in the Constitution that describes who or what an author is.  
 
 67 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 12. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding that wiretapping does not fit 
the definition of “search and seizure” since there is no physical taking of evidence or entry into the 
home) with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that wiretapping does fit within 
the meaning of “search and seizure” of the Fourth Amendment and that the electronic device did 
not physically penetrate the wall of the telephone booth was of “no constitutional significance”). 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The most common understanding of an author is probably a human 
individual who writes a book, but “author” can also plainly be understood to 
mean “one that originates or creates something.”71  
There is enough room here for Congress to argue that, strictly based on 
the text of the Constitution, the programmer could be interpreted as the 
“originator” of a piece of work created by his code.  A broader reading of the 
Constitution could also be made to include an algorithm as an author 
because the algorithm could properly be understood by a person on the street 
as “creating” the work of art.  The text of the Constitution is broad enough 
to support arguments for copyright protection. 
This is not the end of our analysis, however, as a strong textual argument 
will also look at the clause’s location within the text of the Constitution and 
its relationship with the rest of the document.  An example of this type of 
“intratextual” argument can be seen in Chief Justice Marshall’s canonical72 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.73  The argument is clearly presented by 
Professor Akhil Amar.74  In McCulloch, the state of Maryland claimed that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, “though in terms of a grant of power, is not so 
in effect; but is really restrictive.”75  Looking to the text, Chief Justice 
Marshall rejected this argument, reasoning that had the clause been designed 
to restrict rather than grant power, its text would have been worded 
differently.76  The Necessary and Proper Clause is located in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution—a part of the Constitution that grants 
Congress power.77  If the clause was meant to be restrictive, it would have 
been negatively written “in terms resembling these[:] . . . ‘no laws shall be 
passed but such as are necessary and proper.’  Had the intention been to 
make this clause restrictive, it would unquestionably have been so in 
[grammatical and syntactical] form as well as in effect.”78  
 
 71 See Author, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
author (defining “author” as “the writer of a literary work (such as a book)” or “one that originates 
or creates something”). 
 72 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 22 (2012) (“[T]o read McCulloch 
is to behold the art of constitutional interpretation at its acme”). 
 73 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 74 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 750–51 (1999). 
 75 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412. 
 76 Id. at 420. 
 77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof.”). 
 78 Amar, supra note 74, at 751 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420). 
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Just like the Necessary and Proper Clause, the IP Clause is located in 
Article I, Section 8 granting power to Congress.  The IP Clause, properly 
considered within the text of the Constitution, should be understood not as 
a restriction of power but expansion of congressional authority.  Following 
Chief Justice Marshall’s logic in McCulloch, if the clause was meant to be 
restrictive it would have been written negatively like this: “no rights shall be 
secured except for those by authors to their respective writings.”  The clause 
is not written this way, however, and is located in a section of the Constitution 
explicitly granting Congress power.  Thus, while the “man on the street’s” 
definition of “author” may be too ambiguous to be helpful, a strong textual 
argument can be made that Congress does have the authority to extend 
copyright protection to the work of a programmer or even an algorithm that 
does not fit the conventional definition of “author.” 
C.  Structure 
The structural modality of constitutional interpretation is less intuitive 
than a historical or textual argument, but just as important.  Tracing its 
origins back to McCulloch v. Maryland,79 this modality relies on the 
relationships created by the Constitution among the structures it sets up.80  A 
structural argument first sets out an uncontroversial statement about a 
constitutional structure, then infers a relationship from this structure, 
followed by a factual assertion about the world, and finally a conclusion is 
drawn.81 
Here, the chain of logic is as follows: 1) the Constitution, through the IP 
Clause, grants Congress the power to assign exclusive rights to authors to 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts”; 2) we can then infer that 
this power gives rise to congressional authority to structure copyright law in 
a way that achieves this goal; 3) if works by artificial intelligence are not 
eligible for copyright protection, this goal is not achieved; 4) therefore, 
Congress can expand the meaning of “author” to include the programmer 
or the program, thus extending copyright protection to works created by 
artificial intelligence. 
Step one is undisputed and step two flows naturally from step one.  If 
Congress has the power to promote the progress of science and the useful 
 
 79 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 327–28 (making a structural argument that a state, whose 
officials are elected by the state’s constituency, cannot tax the federal government and thus tax a 
nationwide constituency). 
 80 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 12–13. 
 81 Id. at 16. 
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arts, then it must be able to structure copyright law in a way that achieves 
this.  The Constitution does not describe how copyright law should look, nor 
does it define “author,” but rather defers to Congress to iron out the details.  
The potentially problematic assumption is step three.  Because Congress has 
the power to assign rights to promote the progress of science and useful arts 
and has deference to structure copyright law in a way to achieve this goal, in 
order to assign rights to machine-authored works in a constitutionally 
permissible way, the use of copyright law must promote the progress of 
science and useful arts.82 
The best argument that artificial intelligence needs copyright protection 
relies on an incentive theory.  The idea is that copyright law is trying to 
advance a social goal—the promotion of science and the useful arts—but 
there is an inherent under-production problem, also known as a lighthouse 
problem.83  This under-production is caused by non-rivalrous consumption 
and non-excludability of benefits—non-rivalrous because the consumption 
of intellectual property is not diminished by others and non-excludable 
because even those who do not pay can enjoy the works.  This country’s 
solution to incentivize creation of intellectual property is not to give money 
to authors but rather to give them legal exclusivity. 
Here, the problem is that without protection, there would be no way for 
programmers to control who uses their algorithms’ artistic creations.  It 
would be much more expensive for programmers to create works than for 
copyists to reproduce, and thus there would be insufficient incentive to create 
algorithms that produce useful works.  The capability of artificial intelligence 
will only continue to grow and is surely valuable in promoting science and 
the useful arts.  Because fewer useful algorithms, and therefore fewer works, 
would be produced without legal protection, Congress is permitted to extend 
copyright protection to works created by artificial intelligence, even if neither 
 
 82 See Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 130–31 (1983) (statement of Richard H. Stern) 
(testifying that Congress only has the power to legislate copyright law in ways that will promote 
science and the useful arts, not to “create private fortunes” without benefiting the public).  
 83 The Lighthouse is commonly used to illustrate the economic issues associated with non-exclusivity 
and lack of rivalry.  A lighthouse cannot provide its light to paying boats without also providing 
light to non-paying boats.  The consumption of the light by one boat does not diminish the amount 
of light available to other boats.  Thus, the revenue generated by the lighthouse will fall short of the 
social value it creates, resulting in an under-production of lighthouses.  See John Stuart Mill, Principles 
of Political Economy, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 968 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965) 
(describing the lighthouse example). 
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the programmer nor the program fits under the conventional understanding 
of an “author.” 
The incentive theory is not without its critics.  One criticism is that as 
humans we do not need incentive to be creative.  There is some inner drive 
in humans that compels us to create, even if there is not legal protection for 
our creations.  For example, Obvious, the art collective that recently sold its 
Edmond de Belamy painting for over $400,000, seems to have motivations that 
are not purely monetary.  Obvious strives to “explain and democratize 
[advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning] through [their] 
artworks.”84  When asked why they created an algorithm that produces 
paintings, the Obvious coders responded, “we found that portraits provided 
the best way to illustrate our point, which is that algorithms are able to 
emulate creativity.”85  The intellectual curiosity that motivates coders to 
create artificial intelligence in the first place may not need the legal protection 
of copyright.  Additionally, the artificial intelligence itself does not have any 
motives or desires, and thus needs no incentive to create works.  
Another criticism is that we do not want to make it difficult to access 
works, and copyrights inherently make it more difficult for the public to 
access the works.  If copyrights were extended to artificial intelligence, there 
would be an extra cost on society to access the works, which would run 
against the “public good.”86  In a possible near future where artificial 
intelligence becomes even more efficient at producing high-quality works of 
art, it may be in the public’s best interest to have open access to these works. 
Despite these criticisms, however, the incentive theory is still dominant in 
the realm of copyright law.87  Notwithstanding a textual or historical 
argument, Congress could make a plausible structural argument that it has 
the power to extend copyright protection to machine authored works as long 
as doing so promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, even if 
 
 84 About Us, OBVIOUS ART, http://obvious-art.com/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
 85 Jimmy Im, This Portrait Made by A.I. Just Sold for $432,000—That’s 40 Times the Original Estimate, 
CNBC (Oct. 25, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/25/portrait-made-by-
artificial-intelligence-sold-for-432k-at-christies.html. 
 86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001). 
 87 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the [IP Clause] is 
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); see also 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (quoting JAMES BOSWELL, 3 LIFE 
OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934) (1791) (“No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except 
for money.”)). 
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neither the programmer nor the program fit under an intuitive 
understanding of “author.”   
D.  Doctrine 
A doctrinal argument applies rules generated by precedent.88  This 
modality looks at principles generated from caselaw that construes the 
Constitution and interprets it accordingly.89  It should be noted, however, 
that this modality’s “operation is not confined to the application of stare 
decisis . . . . The Court is entitled, indeed obligated, to overrule itself when it 
is persuaded that a particular precedent was wrongly decided and should not 
be applied.”90  Thus, doctrine can guide us on how to interpret the 
Constitution, but a particular court ruling is not the end of the analysis.  
There has never been a case squarely addressing copyright in artificial 
intelligence, but there have been a number of cases regarding who can be 
considered an author.91  For the purposes of this Comment, the most direct 
case is Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.92  Set in the 1880s, the Court 
tackled the controversy surrounding the cutting-edge technology of its day: 
whether “congress had and has the constitutional right to protect 
photographs and negatives thereof by copyright.”93  The petitioners made 
the argument that a photograph is not the production of an author, and 
therefore cannot qualify for copyright protection.94  Acknowledging the 
constitutional nature of this question, Justice Miller went on to define an 
“author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one 
who completes a work of science or literature.”95 
The Court ultimately found that the Constitution was “broad enough to 
cover an act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are 
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”96  While a 
camera uses a mechanical process to create a photograph, the author is 
ultimately the one who selects and arranges the photo shoot entirely from 
 
 88 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13.  
 89 Id. at 18. 
 90 Id. at 20. 
 91 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (stating that 
“author” presupposes a degree of originality, requiring independent creation and a minimal degree 
of creativity). 
 92 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 93 Id. at 55. 
 94 Id. at 56. 
 95 Id. at 57–58. 
 96 Id. at 58. 
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“his own original mental conception.”97  The Court suggested that it is the 
artist’s “intellectual invention” that makes him the author and cited the 
English case Nottage v. Jackson for support.98  
If analyzed in a vacuum, this case seems to show that there is no author 
in a work generated by artificial intelligence.  The algorithm certainly does 
not have a mental conception and in a truly emergent or unforeseen work, 
such as the weaving machine that produces random designs, the patterns 
cannot fairly be considered the programmer’s intellectual invention.  
However, our conception of “author” does not exist in a vacuum but has 
evolved over the years.  One striking example is that employers were not 
recognized as authors.99  The Copyright Act of 1909 was the first statute to 
state that the employer was the “author” in the case of “works made for 
hire.”100 In Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, the Second Circuit found that Walt 
Disney and Irving Berlin were the authors of a song, even though it was 
actually written by the plaintiff and one of Irving’s employees.101  The court 
found that Disney and Berlin were the “motivating factors” in the 
composition of the new song, and having taken the initiative to hire the 
plaintiff, they had the power to “accept, reject, or modify her work.”102  
Professor Peter Jaszi has found the effect of this decision was that the 
Romantic conception of “authorship” was “disaggregated from the 
associated component of intellectual and physical labor.”103 
In the case of works authored by artificial intelligence, the algorithm or 
machine can be viewed as an “employee” and the programmers as the 
employers, and ultimately the authors.  Even though the algorithm is 
undertaking the actual labor of producing the works, it is the programmer 
who takes the initiative to create and instruct the algorithm.  Whatever the 
algorithm creates, the programmers have the ultimate decision to accept, 
reject, or modify the work.  Authorship is no longer thought of in the strictly 
individualistic sense from the nineteenth century and can instead be 
 
 97 Id. at 60. 
 98 Id.; see also Nottage v. Jackson [1883] 52 QB 760 at 769 (Eng.) (“In my opinion, ‘author’ involves 
originating, making, producing, as the inventive or mastermind, the thing which is to be protected, 
whether it be a drawing or a painting or a photograph.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Nottage, 52 QB at 767 (explaining that a person who employs someone to paint a picture of 
a lady “with a dog at her feet, and in one hand holding a flower” is not the author just because he 
has the idea). 
 100 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 487 
(1991). 
 101 Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Jaszi, supra note 100, at 489. 
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understood as the party who is the “inspiration” of the work, which in this 
case belongs to the programmers.  While Professor Bridy has noted that 
works of artificial intelligence cannot be considered works made for hire 
under current copyright law,104 this analogy shows that the Court’s 
understanding of authorship is flexible and has changed over time. 
Recent precedent also suggests that Congress has broad discretion in 
expanding copyright law and courts will generally find congressional changes 
in copyright law to be consistent with the Constitution.  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
the plaintiff challenged the 1998 Copyright Term Extensions Act, arguing 
that it violated the “limited Times” restriction in the IP Clause.105  
Specifically, the plaintiff’s argument was that extending copyright protection 
to existing works meant the work is protected indefinitely, not for a limited 
time.106  Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument in 
part by pointing to a number of instances where the courts deferred to 
Congress’s decisions regarding copyright law.107  While acknowledging that 
the IP Clause’s primary objective is to “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts,” she wrote, “[w]e have also stressed, however, that it is generally 
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright 
Clause’s objectives.”108  The Court went on to hold that “[t]he Copyright 
Clause . . . empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right.”109 
While it may not be obvious or intuitive that a programmer or algorithm 
is an “author” of the work generated by the artificial intelligence, the courts 
will defer to Congress in deciding who qualifies as an author and thus the 
scope of copyright protection.  If Congress can show an enactment extending 
copyright protection to works of artificial intelligence is “rational,” judges will 
defer.110  If we interpret the Eldred decision as evidence of judicial deference 
to congressional legislation of copyright law, then we should expect that a 
court would find congressional expansion of copyrights to artificial 
intelligence to be constitutionally sound. 
The historical practice regarding copyright law mirrors both the 
doctrinal development of a liberal interpretation of “author” and a deference 
 
 104 Bridy, supra note 23, at 27. 
 105 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003). 
 106 Id. at 193–94. 
 107 Id. at 212–13. 
 108 Id. at 212–13, 215. 
 109 Id. at 218 (emphasis in original). 
 110 See id. at 208 (finding that the Act’s extension of protection is “rational” and holding that “we are 
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, 
however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
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to Congress.  The reality is that copyright law has moved exclusively toward 
more protection.111  Every new technology has been granted more 
protection, not less.  For example, the Statute of Anne, the first copyright act 
in England, protected only printed books,112 but the American Copyright Act 
of 1790 covered maps, charts, and books.113  Today copyright law protects 
an open list of works, including: literary works; musical works; dramatic 
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound 
recordings; and architectural works.114  While there may be constitutional 
limits to extending copyright protection, Congress has consistently found the 
best way to encourage progress is by expanding copyright protection. 
E.  Prudence 
A prudential argument breaks from the previous modalities by 
considering the practical effects of an outcome and “seeking to balance the 
costs and benefits of a particular rule.”115  No constitutional decision exists in 
a theoretical bubble, and the practical effects of a particular rule should be 
analyzed.  These costs and benefits depend on political or economic 
realities.116  Professor Bobbitt makes clear that a prudential argument cannot 
be the sole basis of a constitutional decision but can establish a predicate for 
the action.117 
Here, we must consider the pros and cons of providing copyright 
protection to works of artificial intelligence.  One of the main benefits of 
providing copyright protection is the creation of more useful artificial 
intelligence technology.  The United States Government wants to incentivize 
programmers to create more algorithms that produce beautiful and useful 
works, and extending copyright law is a way to do this.  If we buy into the 
notion that there needs to be an incentive structure to create more artificial 
intelligence, then this is a strong prudential argument for protecting 
machine-authored works. 
 
 111 This type of argument proved powerful in Eldred, where Justice Ginsburg relied on the history of 
congressional practice of extending the terms of copyright.  Id. at 200–01. 
 112 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 113 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 114 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
 115 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13. 
 116 Id. at 17; see also, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934) (finding that 
the Minnesota state government properly exercised “the reserved power of the State to protect the 
vital interests of the community” in responding to an emergency). 
 117 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 16. 
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Another benefit of protecting artificial intelligence works is simply the 
availability of more works to the public.  Copyright law does not get into the 
business of evaluating the quality of a work of art,118 but the production of 
more works of art is good for society.  With artificial intelligence, society will 
have more books, faster news reports, and more paintings.  Without a legal 
structure that incentivizes the creation of artificial intelligence, society would 
miss out on these potential benefits. 
There are also costs associated with extending copyright protection, 
however.  For one, there is the issue of copyright ownership.  A complicated 
piece of code requires many different programmers and often involves open 
source code.  Can a programmer who was involved with just a section of the 
code really lay legal claim to a painting produced by the completed 
algorithm?  For example, Obvious was criticized for using a piece of code 
created by a teenager on GitHub, an open source software development 
platform, in creating its Edmond de Belamy painting.119  Should the teenager 
receive a copyright for the output of Obvious’s algorithm?  The issue of 
copyright ownership may also require Congress to delve into the existential 
question of whether the artificial intelligence can qualify for legal 
personhood.120  This Comment does not probe the issue of ownership, but it 
must be considered when weighing the costs and benefits of extending 
copyright protection.  
Another important issue is the cost to the public of a world with more 
copyrights.  Copyright law acts as an incentive for authors to produce more 
works but can lead to supracompetitive pricing as a result of a legal monopoly 
on the work.  In a possibly not-so-distant future where artificial intelligence 
is producing a large amount of the art and literature we consume, the 
copyright owners can charge a high price for their algorithms’ outputs.  
Especially in a scenario where just a few corporations dominate the field of 
artificial intelligence,121 a legal monopoly over the output of the artificial 
 
 118 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
 119 Tom Simonite, How a Teenager’s Code Spawned a $432,500 Piece of Art, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/teenagers-code-spawned-dollar-432500-piece-of-art/. 
 120 See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (asking 
whether an artificial intelligence can become a legal person). 
 121 See Tiernan Ray, Google Has the All-Important AI Edge Over Microsoft, THESTREET (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/google-ai-edge-over-microsoft-14821147 (describing 
the dominance of Google and Microsoft in the market of machine learning). 
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intelligence could mean a shift of costs to the public and less public access to 
these works. 
Congress should also be aware of the distributional effects of replacing 
human authors with artificially intelligent ones.  As artificial intelligence 
grows in efficiency, human artists that cannot compete will be displaced.  Of 
course, many jobs are already in danger of “computerisation,” and 
occupations requiring creativity, like authors or fine artists, are not currently 
at high risk of displacement.122  Extending copyright protection to works of 
artificial intelligence, however, would likely exacerbate  displacement by 
allowing creators of the algorithms to monetize their programs’ outputs.  
This may also favor large corporations who have the resources to create 
innovative algorithms at the expense of individual artists.  
In addition to the increased administrative and litigation costs that come 
with expanding copyright law, extending copyright protection could lead to 
a chilling effect on future creativity.  We are currently living in a “remix age” 
where creativity depends on existing works.  By providing copyright to the 
works of artificial intelligence, Congress may be giving too much protection 
to the original creators and stifling the creativity of those who are inspired to 
create derivative works.  Thus, as artificial intelligence is able to create more 
works faster, the costs imposed on society by an expansive copyright scheme 
may outweigh the benefits to the owners of the copyrighted works.  As noted 
earlier, however, incentive theory drives much of the policy behind copyright 
law, and thus Congress still has a powerful prudential argument to extend 
copyright protection. 
F.  Ethos 
An ethical argument “deriv[es] rules from those moral commitments of 
the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.”123  The idea is 
that the American people have a distinct national identity with certain 
traditions and beliefs that are embedded in the Constitution.124  Professor 
 
 122 Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to 
Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 270–71 (ranking “fine artists, 
including painters, sculptors, and illustrators” and “writers and authors” as at a relatively low risk 
of “computerisation,” around the same as lawyers). 
 123 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13.  
 124 BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45129, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 20 (2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45129.pdf; see also, e.g., 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking 
down an Ohio zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single 
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Bobbitt found this type of argument covered the “patch[es] of uncolored 
text,” where a judicial opinion “contains expressions of considerable passions 
and conviction” not seen in the other modalities.125  It is important to note, 
however, that this modality is not a moral argument generally.126  Thus, we 
are not concerned with moral implications for considering a programmer or 
program as the author, but rather the American tradition and moral 
commitments reflected in the Constitution. 
Limited government is a fundamental American constitutional ethos, and 
here, the Constitution limits congressional power to extend copyright 
protection only to works of authors.127  This limitation and others, such as 
“for limited times” and “to promote science and useful arts,” are important 
in recognizing the American ethos of limited government.  The Framers were 
simultaneously providing Congress powers but also limiting its authority to 
prevent any potential for abuse.  One example of copyright abuse is the 
creation of monopolies.  Copyright law effectively grants a legal monopoly 
to the holder of the copyright.  The Framers were fundamentally opposed to 
monopolies,128 and while James Madison’s arguments for the necessity of the 
IP Clause ultimately won, he also wrote that monopolies must be “guarded 
with strictness agst [sic] abuse.”129  In a potential future where many works 
are generated by artificial intelligence, extending copyright protection could 
give the corporations that create the algorithms a huge control over the 
public.  Congress should not be able to blur the boundaries of the IP Clause 
to interpret “author” in such a way that would harm the public by giving 
monopolistic power to corporations in the business of artificial intelligence. 
Next to limited government in the pantheon of American values is free 
speech but extending copyright protection to works created by artificial 
intelligence could also negatively impact the public’s freedom of speech.  As 
Professor Dotan Oliar argues, “[c]opyright law hampers free speech because 
it prevents people from writing, copying, publishing, disseminating, or 
performing forms of speech that would have been otherwise permissible.”130  
 
family because “the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
and is “deserving of constitutional recognition”). 
 125 Bobbitt, supra note 36, at 727. 
 126 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 21. 
 127 Id.  
 128 See Oliar, supra note 26, at 65 (writing that Jefferson thought it would be better to prohibit all 
monopolies than to allow an exception for intellectual property rights). 
 129 James Madison, Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments., in Elizabeth Fleet, 
Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 551 (1946). 
 130 Oliar, supra note 26, at 65. 
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Considering the program or programmer as the author would extend 
copyright protection to machine-authored works and thus expand the 
reaches of copyright law.  Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of the 
American national identity and would caution against any expansion of 
copyright law that infringes on it. 
While these are strong arguments against the expansion of governmental 
power, the Constitution was also heavily influenced by the Enlightenment.131  
This American ethos of progress and promotion of human ingenuity is 
powerful.132  The United States became a world leader in science and 
engineering by investing heavily in research and development, producing the 
most advanced degrees in science and engineering, and publishing high-
impact scientific publications.133  Americans believe that the Federal 
Government should continue to provide funds for scientific research to 
ensure America remains competitive globally.134  If a broad interpretation of 
“author” promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, then Congress 
would be in line with American ethos in expanding copyright law. 
II.  RECONCILING THE MODALITIES 
So, is it constitutionally permissible to consider the programmer or the 
algorithm as an “author,” and is Congress therefore able to extend copyright 
protection to works created by artificial intelligence?  We have considered 
the question from six different constitutional perspectives, but we still need 
to reconcile each perspective’s outcome.  A historical argument shows that 
objectively, the programmer or algorithm could fit under a period 
dictionary’s definition of “author,” but probably not under the Framers’ 
understanding of an “author.”  Under the textual modality, a contemporary 
“man on the street” would have a more liberal understanding of “author” 
and we see that the location of the IP Clause in the Constitution and the 
sentence structure grants a broad discretionary power to Congress.  
Structurally, the IP Clause grants Congress authority as long as the extension 
of copyright protection to works of artificial intelligence would promote 
“science and useful arts.”  Turning to the doctrine, works generated by 
 
 131 See generally Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitutional Law, 4 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1992) (arguing that the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment had a 
significant influence on the development of the American Constitution). 
 132 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (stating that the “utility” 
of a power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . will scarcely be questioned”). 
 133 U.S. Science and Technology Leadership Increasingly Challenged by Advances in Asia, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Jan. 
19, 2016), https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=137394. 
 134 Id. 
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artificial intelligence may not have an author under a strict reading of Burrow-
Giles, but by deferring to Congress, an acceptable scheme of copyright 
protection could be argued by analogizing to Picture Music, Inc. and the “work 
made for hire” doctrine.  Eldred and a consistent historical practice towards 
expanding copyright protection also support a broad interpretation of the IP 
Clause.  Prudentially, copyright law may be the best way to encourage the 
production of more artificial intelligence, but it would be difficult to construct 
an acceptable legal framework for assigning rights and society may bear the 
costs of more copyrights.  From an ethical perspective, the Constitution 
stands for limiting the power of government and protecting free speech, but 
also celebrates scientific progress.  
There is no hierarchy among these modalities and to rank them would 
delegitimize the procedure of constitutional interpretation.135  Indeed, 
constitutional interpretation is not simply a mathematical equation where 
one plugs in the modalities and receives the correct outcome—even within 
the modalities there are conflicting arguments.136  What this constitutional 
analysis provides us, then, is not a single correct answer to the problem, but 
rather a sound process to explore the strong constitutional arguments on both 
sides.  
Of course, the decision of whether it is constitutional to extend copyright 
to works of artificial intelligence will ultimately come down to a judge’s 
individual decision, guided by his or her sensibilities.137 This does not mean, 
however, that we cannot use the modalities to accurately interpret the IP 
Clause.  By viewing each modality not as an end but as a means towards a 
holistic understanding of the Constitution, we can conclude that it would be 
constitutionally permissible for Congress to pass a law extending copyright 
protection to works of artificial intelligence by considering the programmer 
as the author, even if the programmer does not fit the conventional 
definition. 
This Comment’s analysis demonstrates that the algorithm itself cannot 
be considered an “author” under the Constitution.  Intratextualism, 
constitutional structure, and historical practice show that Congress is given a 
wide degree of discretion in extending copyright, but for the clause to have 
any meaning, there must be some limits.  The original understanding of 
“author” and the purpose behind the IP Clause suggest an algorithm that 
possesses no creative thought and no personhood to lay claim to its outputs 
 
 135 BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 155–56. 
 136 Id. at 155. 
 137 Id. at 168, 177. 
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is not an author.  While our understanding of the term is broad, it would be 
a stretch even today to find that an algorithm fits the definition of “author,” 
and is more akin to an artist’s paintbrush than the artist herself.  The 
algorithm needs no incentive to produce, which undermines the structural 
and prudential arguments, and while we may no longer have a romantic 
conception of “authorship,” there still appears to be a requirement of 
“inspiration” or “creativity” in copyright law doctrine. 
At the same time, a world where works of artificial intelligence receive no 
copyright protection is undesirable.  If we accept the premise that there is an 
inherent under-production problem for works of artificial intelligence, then 
without copyright we would have many fewer works and algorithms capable 
of creating these works.  Works of artificial intelligence have proven to be 
useful, valuable, and promising for future developments in artificial 
intelligence.  Intuitively, something so important to the future of American 
innovation should be protected. 
If Congress wants to find a way to extend copyright protection to works 
of strong artificial intelligence, it would be constitutionally permissible do so 
by considering the programmers as the authors.  The programmer is a 
human individual with creativity, satisfying an originalist and contemporary 
understanding of “author.”  While the programmer may not know exactly 
what the algorithm will produce, by analogizing to the work-for-hire 
doctrine, we can view the programmer as the “inspiration” for the work and 
the algorithm as the employee.  In light of the textual and structural power 
given to Congress, and the American ethos and prudence to encourage 
scientific innovation, a judge would likely follow the Eldred reasoning and 
defer to a congressional act extending copyright protection to artificial 
intelligence. 
CONCLUSION 
In a world where works like Obvious Art’s Edmond de Belamy become more 
pervasive and valuable, Congress may rethink the Copyright Office’s stance 
that works of strong artificial intelligence are not works of authorship.  
Congress may want to expand the reach of copyright protection to works 
created by artificial intelligence by amending the Copyright Act, and if it 
does, it is crucial to understand the constitutional limitations it would face.  
Employing Professor Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional interpretation, 
this analysis considers the Constitution holistically and allows us to properly 
understand the IP Clause.  By looking to the Constitution, this Comment 
concludes that Congress can constitutionally consider the programmer as the 
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“author,” and therefore an act expanding copyright protection to works of 
artificial intelligence would be constitutionally sound. 
 
